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I have been asked to comment on one or more of the papers of this
Symposium. This is a roving commission; I am free to choose my target. I
choose.., nothing.
Maybe not quite nothing, but close enough. I will comment on a near-
absence. Where is the economic analysis in this Symposium-or indeed, in
this field of law? Payment law is a species of the family "business law" and
genus "commercial law": traditional grist for the law-and-economics mill.
But you would not know it from this Symposium. The Alces-Hopkins pa-
per' is good and economically astute. It applies when contract terms are a
material part of a consumer product: insurance, credit, or licenses, as well
as payments. It is far more than a payment paper, and thus not a payment
paper.2 The Gillette-Walt paper is closer to the mark. It is overtly familiar
with the economic literature, and pertinent to payments.3 But this good
paper shares some curious limitations of scope with the rest of the litera-
ture, discussed below. And these two papers are the only ones that cite
economic literature.
This general lack of economic analysis is striking-one of Sherlock
Holmes' dogs that did not bark in the night. This Symposium is not excep-
tional. Posner's great economic adventure story never traveled to the land
* Counsel and Assistant Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The author may be
contacted at joseph.sommer@ny.frb.org. Nothing in this paper is necessarily the opinion of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York or any other component of the Federal Reserve System. This paper arose
out of a sidebar with Avery Katz at the Symposium. It has benefited from the comments of Rich Field,
David Gross, Stephanie Heller, Ken Kettering, and Dov Weinstein. None of these people are responsi-
ble for the errors of this paper, although Stephanie always feels responsible for everything.
This paper is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Esther Sommer, who always told me that
scholarship is foolishness. You should always listen to your mother.
1. Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
879 (2008).
2. See also Norman I. Silber, Late Charges, Regular Billing, and Reasonable Consumers: A
Rationale for a Late Payment Act, 83 CHI-KENT L. REv. 855 (2008) (consumer billing).
3. Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment Systems, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 499 (2008).
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of payments, although it dallied with eronomics. 4 Is the law of money,
then, less economic than the law of love?
I am overstating for effect. There is some economic analysis of pay-
ment law. Economists-who for our purpose include lawyers playing
economists-often study the network economics of payment systems.5
Their work has legal implications, sounding in antitrust. But these implica-
tions do not extend to the legal doctrine that supports these systems: the
core topic of old-fashioned law and economics. There is one traditional
exception to this void. There is a strong literature-either explicitly eco-
nomic or economically-informed--on the allocation of payment loss from
mistake or fraud. 6 (This is the topic of one of the panels of this Sympo-
sium. 7) There is also a smattering of literature on the measure of damages
for bank misfeasance. 8 But that is it.9
As far as I know, there is no economic analysis of the legal plumbing
of payments: the clearing and settlement rules contained in the common
law 10 and U.C.C. Articles 4 and 4A. Not little analysis-no analysis at all.
This Symposium is a good case in point. One panel, on payment finality,
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003). Cf. Arthur Allen Leff,
Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974)
(Posner as picaresque).
5. E.g., DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC (2d ed. 2005); THE
FuTuRE OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS (Andrew G. Haldane, Stephen Millard & Victoria Saporta eds. 2008).
6. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Pay-
ments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 71 n.42 (1987) (collecting pre-1970 law review articles). More explicitly
economic work includes: id.; Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Sys-
tems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996); Gillette & Walt, supra note 3; Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of
Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633 (2005); James Steven Rogers, The Basic
Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453 (2004).
7. See Francis J. Facciolo, Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the
Losses, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 (2008); Linda J. Rusch, Reimagining Payment Systems: Allocation
of Riskfor Unauthorized Payment Inception, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 561 (2008). Other papers, outside
the panel, also dealt with this subject. See Mark E. Budnitz, Commentary, Technology as the Driver of
Payment System Rules: Will Consumers Be Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
909 (2008); Gillette & Walt, supra note 3; Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five Things
To Do Today with Payments Law and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products and New Pay-
ments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769 (2008); Sarah Jane Hughes, Duty Issues in the Ever-Changing
World ofPayments Processing: Is It Time for New Rules?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 721 (2008).
8. The seminal case: Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982). The litera-
ture includes: Mark Budnitz, The Finicky Computer, The Paperless Telex and the Fallible Swiss: Bank
Technology and the Law, 25 B.C. L. REV. 259, 294 (1984); Cooter & Rubin, supra note 6, at 92-97;
Gillette & Walt, supra note 3; Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments
Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664 (1983). A symposium paper on a closely-related topic: Anita Ramasas-
try, Confusion and Convergence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in Error Resolution Appropri-
ate?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813 (2008).
9. But see infra note 38.
10. My favorite treatise on the common law: ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
ch. 67 (One Volume ed. 1952). Mileage may vary. See also James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law of
Electronic Money, 58 SMU L. REV. 1253 (2005).
[Vol 83:2
WHERE IS THE ECONOMIC ANAL YSIS?
contained three excellent papers. None of them used economic analysis;
they were all doctrinal.'1 This is the problem I seek to explain. Why is
there no economic analysis of the core payment law that governs clearing
and settlement?
My approach to this problem will resemble skeet shooting. I release a
few clay pigeons and fire on the wing. The word "scattershot" might come
to mind, but that is a feature, not a bug. If you do not like one of my an-
swers, you might like another. And if you dislike them all, you might come
up with one of your own. (Refutation is the sincerest form of flattery.) And
if you like none of them, and feel patient, you can wait for my book on the
law of bank deposits, which will cover this topic (and many others) in great
detail.
I will launch four pigeons into the air:
1. The chief instrumental goal of core payment law is not economic effi-
ciency. Not all instrumental reasoning is economic. Instead, core
payment law is a branch of... engineering.
2. Much of payment law is explicable in terms of sociology, not eco-
nomics. Sociology and engineering are consistent.
3. Network economics has few implications for core payment law.




Sometimes, the simplest answer to a question is the correct one.
Maybe there is little economic analysis of core payment law because core
payment law has little to do with economics. This conjecture is rank her-
esy. Modem economics has an imperial reach. If economists can study
almost any field of law, surely core payment law should be no exception.
Payments are money in motion, and economics has a little something to do
with money.
Like most good heresies, mine is a complex one, entailing a leap of
faith. To get there, we shall take a detour away from economics. I start by
imposing a structure on payment law. This structure consists of two princi-
1I. Benjamin Geva, Payment Finality and Discharge in Funds Transfers, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
633 (2008); Andrew Kull, Restitution and Final Payment, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 677 (2008); James
Steven Rogers, Unification of Payments Law and the Problem of Insolvency Risk in Payment Systems,
83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2008).
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pies, which I have called "nominalism" and "privity." 12 I will define these
principles, and then show how they pervade payment law, both as norma-
tive criteria for evaluating payment law, and as positive predictors of the
content of the law. I will argue that these principles are engineering design
principles. These engineering design principles have tremendous explana-
tory power; conventional economics has had none. Then comes the crux of
the heresy: engineering is not reducible to economics. This is the leap of
faith, but a small one. If you leap with me, you then conclude that core
payment law is an engineering construct that has little to do with econom-
ics.
Let us start with privity. It is more familiar than nominalism, although
ultimately more abstract.
I use "privity" with its normal legal meaning. Contracts bind the par-
ties to them, but have limited third-party consequences. Privity is potent in
payment law, because most payment systems are built on contract. Pay-
ment systems rely on bank money; bank money relies on bank deposits;
13
bank deposits are debt obligations; 14 debt is contract. Payment transactions
are built from these contractual units. A single account-based payment
involves the two end parties, their banks, maybe some intermediaries, and
perhaps some communications firms. Privity orders this complexity into
simple pairwise relationships: 15 between account holders and their banks,
between banks, or between senders and their communications providers.
U.C.C. Articles 4A and 8 are dominated by privity; it is very difficult to
bring a claim outside the privity chain. 1
6
12. See Joseph H. Sommer, A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Trans-
fer Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 1181 (1998). These design principles also apply to U.C.C. Articles 5 and 8, as
well as parts of U.C.C. Article 9. Id. at 1199.
13. I exclude negotiable payment systems from this discussion, but lose nothing from this exclu-
sion. Modem check law does not need negotiability, and no other payment system-except currency-
even pretends to rely on it. Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems,
44 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1997); James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Con-
cepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REv. 929 (1987); Albert J. Rosenthal,
Negotiability--Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971). But see infra note 19.
14. E.g., Carr v. Carr, (1811) 1 Mer. 543, 35 Eng. Rep. 799 (Ch.); Citizens Bank of Md. v.
Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995).
15. Conflict-of-law aficionados will respond that no legal relationship is pairwise; there is also an
adjudicator to consider, and maybe a set of legal rules, as well. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vested-
ness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1254 (1987). Cf Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two
willing spouses and an approving State."). This objection is worth noting, but only in a footnote.
16. In Article 4A, the informational privity is particularly apparent in the section 4A-211 rules for
cancellation of a payment order. Credit privity is apparent in, say, the money-back guarantee rule. See
Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1998). In Article 8, the privity is wired
into the statutory text in several places; e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-502, -503(d)-(e), -510(a) (2005).
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Privity is structural. A network contains many possible relationships.
Everything is potentially connected, and the number of potential connec-
tions is enormous. If all possible interactions are permitted, a system of n
members contains 2"-(n+l) possible interactions. 17 But privity limits this
number considerably. If the privity is pure, all interactions are dyadic. Each
of the n members may interact with any of the remaining (n-i) members.
Multiplying the two, and dividing by 2 (these, after all, are dyads), we get
n(n-1)/2=(n2-n)/2 dyads for "n" actors. This is an astonishing parsimony:
2100-10 30 ; (1002-100)/2 = 4950.
But structural privity is stronger yet. It lets parties avoid relationships.
In other words, privity lets parties simplify their system topology. There
may be 4950 possible credit and informational dyads for a payment com-
munity of 100 persons. But if they all chose one bank as an intermediary,
the number of credit dyads would collapse to 100 (or 99). And remember,
we all participate in the payment system: 18 "n" is a number in the billions.
Could you imagine life with billions of people running accounts with each
other, and settling these accounts only when they can set them off or enter a
multilateral arrangement with third parties who also had offsetting obliga-
tions? This describes specie-starved America at the time of the Revolution.
For understandable reasons, bank charters were nearly simultaneous with
independence. These banks (and ours) serve to simplify credit topology,
acting as common intermediaries.
Wait, there is more! Privity is causal, as well as structural. Privity does
to account relationships what negotiability does to property relations. Priv-
ity cuts off adverse claims, and abolishes the relevant history of the ac-
count. If my bank balance is $ 100, privity implies that there is nothing else
to know about the balance. With privity, the original source of funding is
irrelevant. Bank balances originate from incoming payments; these incom-
ing payments involve third-party payors; third parties traduce privity.
Q.E.D. Privity, then, is payment finality. There is an old quip: God created
time to ensure that everything does not happen at once. Here is a new one:
17. The system would have one possible interaction of all n members; n possible interactions of
(n-l) members, and more generally, there will be:
jlO.n -A)!
interactions among every possible combination of membership. This sum is, conveniently, 2". We must
then subtract the non-interactions that this formula gives: the one possible interaction of no members,
and the n possible interactions of one member. I am grateful to David Gross for introducing me to
combinatorial mathematics.
18. True, many of us are unbanked, and do not participate in a privity payment system. But this is
a quibble. See infra note 19.
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Mammon created privity to cleanse the payment system of Judas's thirty
pieces of silver.19
Privity is never an absolute; it has exceptions. Third parties can assert
rights. This complicates the system. To simplify matters, assume that third-
party rights only affect the dyad and cannot interact (e.g., bank garnish-
ments on solvent depositors). This assumption changes the total number of
possible relations from (n2-n)/2 to (n2-n)(n-2)/2=(n3 -3n 2+2n)/2, which is
generally an increase. More importantly, it denies parties the plenary power
to bilaterally structure their relations. Some third-party relations (e.g., joint
accounts or security interests as original collateral) are consensual. Most
are not. A consensual three-party relationship is difficult enough to de-
sign;20 a nonconsensual relationship is impossible.
The privity of payment law is stronger than that of general contract
law.21 However, even payment privity has exceptions. Most of these excep-
tions are worth the added complexity. Discharge rules are a good example:
an interbank legal relationship can determine the payor-payee relationship.
Insolvency is another example, because the value of a person's claim on an
insolvent depends on the value of others' claims. Creditor's rights are a
third example, although some state laws take a jaundiced view of bank
account garnishments. There are others. But not all exceptions to privity are
useful. Joint accounts are a mess. 22 I think that tracing is bad law-an opin-
ion shared by many others.23 But tracing is the law in Anglo-American
19. Yeah, yeah, I know. Judas was paid in silver, not bank accounts. Commodity money is subject
to the property law of negotiability, not the contract law of privity. This is a distinction without a differ-
ence. As a distinguished eighteenth-century combinatorial mathematician noted: "It has been quaintly
said, 'that the reason why [commodity] money can not be followed is, because it has no ear-mark:' but
this is not true. The true reason is, upon account of the currency of it: it can not be recovered after it has
passed in currency." Miller v. Race, (1758) 1 Burr. 452,457, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B.) (Mansfield,
L.J.).
20. See Joint Task Force on Deposit Account Control Agreements, ABA Section of Bus. Law,
Initial Report of the Joint Task Force on Deposit Account Control Agreements, 61 BUS. LAw. 745, 747
(2006). The report sought to craft an industry-standard security interest in bank accounts: a tri-partite
agreement. It claimed to be merely "initial" despite two years in the making.
21. For examples, see infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
22. Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 45, 47-50 (2006); Martha A. Churchill, Annotation, Joint Bank Account as Subject to
Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution by Creditor of One Joint Depositor, 86 A.L.R.5th 527 (2001).
23. For example, see Lord Mansfield ("money cannot be followed"), in Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at
401. As another example, there is Grant Gilmore, who would only trace proceeds into a segregated
account. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1 27.4, at 735-36 (1965).
Tracing does not exist in civil law jurisdictions, and is not popular with United States legal scholars.
See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity Principles
into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 281 (1990); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why
All Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2004); Dale A. Oesterle,
Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-
306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172 (1983); James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12
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jurisdictions, and is inconsistent with privity. Asset forfeiture-which re-
lies on extreme tracing principles-is only justified by its non-commercial
benefits, such as its signal success with the illicit narcotics trade.
Our other design principle may be less familiar than privity, but is
simpler. We shall call it "nominalism"-a word with many meanings, 24
which we shall use as a term of art. Our nominalism is a kind of super-
formalism. Nominalism attributes legal rights to authentic communications
based solely on their data content and rules that operate on the data. Nomi-
nalistic rules accept authentic communications as input. The rules operate
solely on the data contained in the communication (including, perhaps,
time of receipt and transmission). The product is a legal right: a function
solely of the data and rules. I am using computer language (for a reason),
but nominalism is an old idea in the law, and as old as negotiability. "To fit
[currency] for its purpose[,] the stamp denotes its value, and possession
alone must decide to whom it belongs. '25 For "stamp," substitute "data
content;" for "possession," substitute "authentication." Nominalism is the
old law of negotiable instruments, abstracted to a computerized age. Or to
abstract even further, consider the old nursery rhyme: "My face is my for-
tune."
Let us return to the computer lingo. Nominalistic legal rules are device
drivers, converting symbolic input states to legal rights as output states.
This is no metaphor-I mean it literally. Modem bank operations require
digital computers. Computers process symbols with rules, transforming
symbolic inputs into outputs. Therefore, to the extent that payment law
merely gives legal effect to bank operations, it must be nominalistic. (Hu-
mans may conduct bank operations if they act like computers-the Turing
test run backward. 26) Some exceptions to privity are good for payment law.
But any payment rule that rejects nominalism will harm bank operations, 27
and bears a heavy burden of justification.
CARDOZO L. REv. 471 (1990); Steven Walt & Emily L. Sherwin, Contribution Arguments in Commer-
cial Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 897 (1993).
24. We can safely ignore its meaning in medieval philosophy. Far closer to home, the term is used
in the law of money. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 90 (5th ed. 1992). We ignore this
meaning here, as well.
25. Wookey v. Pole, (1820)4 B. & Aid. 1, 7, 106 Eng. Rep. 839, 841 (K.B.).
26. Cf Herman Melville, Bartleby the Scrivener: A Tale of Wall Street (pts. I & 2), PUTNAM'S
MONTHLY, Nov. 1853, at 546, PUTNAM'S MONTHLY, Dec. 1853, at 609, available at
http://cdl.library.comell.edu/moa/browse.journals/putn. I 853.html.
27. The classic example is the old Article 4 process of posting, rejected by West Side Bank v.
Marine National Exchange Bank, 155 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. 1968). (Nominalism works on negotiable
paper, as well as accounts. See Wookey, 106 Eng. Rep. at 839; cf supra note 19 and accompanying
text.) Posting is not nominalistic, because it does not refer to a communication, but rather to an internal
bank process. The nominalistic form of the midnight deadline test refers solely to times established by
2008]
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By now, I hope you understand these terms, and my prima facie ar-
guments in their favor. But to see how pervasive these concepts are, there is
nothing like example after example after example. I will quickly throw out
about a dozen examples of nominalism or privity in payment law, and take
a quick shot at each. The process is noisy, and my aim might not be true. I
only hope to hit the target often enough to keep you amused:
* Account Stated Doctrine. The account stated doctrine is a general
principle of contract law. It is an evidentiary doctrine. A state-
ment of account is presumptively true, if rendered by one party
and communicated to the other party without demur. The doc-
trine also exists in payment law, in supercharged version. Instead
of an evidentiary presumption, it has preclusive effect.28 This
aids nominalism by reducing disputes over authentication.
* Choice of Law. Modem banking choice-of-law is intensely
nominalistic. Modem statutes key off the "location" of the rele-
vant branch, as determined essentially by agreement. 29 These
statutes abandon the old "place of performance" test, acknowl-
edging that tangibility is irrelevant in a computerized, symbolic
world.30 We have already discussed the subtle relation of choice-
of-law and privity.31
* Computerization. We have already discussed how nominalism
enables computer operations. Privity has a role, too. Nominalism
works at the level of an individual bank's computer system; priv-
ity simplifies the network topology between systems.
* Disputes. Only two industries sell their liabilities as products:
banking and insurance. The volume of payments is far higher
than the volume of insurance claims: trillions of dollars of pay-
ments every single business day. Yet insurance policies are a
magnet for litigation, and payments are not. Payments are seldom
litigated, except for inauthentic messages. The difference be-
communications: the time the check was received, and the time the check was returned. Amended
Article 4 adopted West Side Bank.
28. See U.C.C. §§ 4-406, 4A-505, 8-406 (2005). U.C.C. Article 5 does not have such a preclusion
rule, but it does have a short one-year limitations period. U.C.C. § 5-115.
29. U.C.C. §§ 5-116(b), 8-110(e), 9-304(b). See Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?,
57 MD. L. REv. I (1998).
30. See U.C.C. § 8-110(f) ("A securities intermediary's jurisdiction is not determined by the
physical location of certificates representing financial assets, or. .. by the location of facilities for data
processing or other record keeping concerning the account."); Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law, Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an
Intermediary art. 6, July 5, 2006,46 I.L.M. 649, 653 (2007) (similar).
31. See supra note 15.
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tween payments and insurance litigation? Insurance law is not
nominalistic; payment law is. Nominalistic law is predictable law
based on unchallengeable fact (if authentic). Predictable law is
seldom litigated. Privity also shares a role, reducing the number
of permissible parties to a dispute and clarifying their roles.
Formalism. Payment law is very formalistic-U.C.C. Article 4A
almost seems drafted in machine code. As we can see by now,
this makes sense. Article 4A is implemented by machine code.
As discussed above, formalism is implicit in nominalism.
* Interfaces. The checking system is too complex for most law-
yers, but simple enough for most individuals. There is no para-
dox here: the operations are complex, but the user interface is
simple. By no coincidence, this is also true for computers, i.e.,
extremely complex machines operable by children. How does
this work? Ask our old friends: privity and nominalism. A com-
plex system can have a simple interface if the design is suffi-
ciently modular (see below), the responses are sufficiently
predictable, and the inputs carefully controlled. Users only notice
the complexities of the operating level when things go wrong.
* Limited Third-Party Rights. As discussed above, privity is the
account analogue of negotiability. Unsurprisingly, third-party
rights are rare in payment law: more so than in ordinary contract
law. The ordinary creditor process is effective, but "adverse
claim" statutes preclude third-party self-help through notifica-
tion. Article 4A strictly forbids creditor process that does not re-
spect privity.32 Perfected security interests in bank deposits
require the bank's consent, at least for original collateral. 33 Some
cases suggest that bank deposits are unassignable in common
law. 34 Even insolvency is a special case in the law of bank de-
posits. 35 Finally, a bank may offset a fiduciary's debts to the
32. U.C.C. §§ 4A-502(d), 4A-503. This result is threatened by asset forfeiture cases, such as
United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993), or cases that adopt forfeiture principles, such as
Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002).
33. U.C.C. § 9-342. Of course, a security interest in the proceeds of a bank deposit does not
require a bank's consent. But proceeds are a close cousin of tracing, and much of the anti-tracing litera-
ture was motivated by proceeds. See supra note 23.
34. Deposit Protection Bd. v. Barclays Bank PLC, [1994] 2 A.C. 367 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Ch.); Gibraltar Realty Corp. v. Mt. Vernon Trust Co., 12 N.E.2d 438 (N.Y. 1938).
35. Older payment law was eager to award insolvency priority to bank deposits, insulating them
from the bank's balance sheet. This still remains in U.C.C. section 4-216 and the law of special depos-




bank against a fiduciary account, if the bank is not aware of the
fiduciary nature of the account. 36
" Modularity. Thanks to privity, payment systems are modular.
This separates roles and simplifies the allocation of risk and re-
sponsibility. Even though the payment system is an integrated
system, modularity lets parties adjust their bilateral relationships
without adjusting their relationships with the rest of the system. 37
With a modular structure, new elements (i.e., parties) may be
added at any time, in any sequence, without affecting the rest of
the system. This can be quite difficult for a less modular struc-
ture. You cannot add milk to an omelet after the eggs have set.
Modularity also allows for malfunction (a common theme in this
Symposium). A bad module will only weakly affect other mod-
ules, limiting damage to the system.
* Payment finality. I have already alluded to this. Privity is a suffi-
cient (if not necessary) condition for payment finality. A pay-
ment is final when the resulting bank balance no longer depends
on the payment's history, or the relationship between the end
parties to the payment 38 (This is not the only possible definition
of finality.) Like negotiability, privity demolishes the history of
the account, providing finality.
* Risk. Nominalism' and privity push transaction risk outside of
payment law, and often outside the banking system. (This point
is explicitly made in the prefatory note to U.C.C. Article 4A.) To
the extent that the law respects nominalism and privity, a bank
has no payment risk if it avoids operational errors and insolvent
counterparties. This may be a bug or a feature, depending on
your views on loss allocation and loss spreading. (Nominalism
and privity do not preclude bank liability outside of payment law,
e.g., restitution.) Note that nominalism explains the meek meas-
ure of damages that typifies most of payment law. Consequential
36. See B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Bank's Right to Apply Third Person's Funds, Deposited in
Debtor's Name, on Debtor's Obligation, 8 A.L.R.3d 235 (1966).
37. This is the basis for Fox & Ballen's suggestion that interbank rulesets be adjustable by pure
private law, independently of (public) consumer law. Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, The Role of
Private Sector Payment Rules and a Proposed Approach for Evaluating Future Changes to Payments
Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 937 (2008). This suggestion is no better than the privity in payment law,
and becomes questionable where privity is weak: e.g., insolvency, payment finality, creditor process.
38. This opens a fascinating conceptual question (to me, at least). Is a non-final payment really a
payment at all? It depends, I suppose, on how one defines "payment." If non-final payments are indeed
payments, I suppose that I should be fair, and note that there is some informal normative economic
work on the reversibility of the credit card system. E.g., Gillette & Walt, supra note 3; Mann, supra
note 6.
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damages rely on facts outside the data content of the parties'
communications, and hence are not nominalistic.
* Risk Management. Privity simplifies risk management, by allow-
ing a party to select those to whom it is exposed.
* Scope of Payment law. Most people consider U.C.C. Article 5 to
be "payment law," even though it contains no discharge rule, and
its definition of "honor" adverts to means of payment defined
outside of Article 5. Their instincts are correct, or at least in ac-
cord with this Commentary. Article 5 is a law of privity (the in-
dependence principle) and nominalism (documentary
conditions). The same is true for U.C.C. Article 8. Similarly,
parts of revised U.C.C. Article 9 that appear to be a concession to
the bank lobby are consistent with these principles. 39
Nominalism and privity explain core payment doctrine remarkably
well, at least as a first pass. My bullet points may have all the finesse of a
blunderbuss. But there are so many of them! They do not all have to hit the
mark. Even allowing for bad aim, they still explain more core payment law,
in a unified way, than the entire economic literature. Nominalism and priv-
ity explain almost everything but inauthentic messages and antitrust.
(Nominalism assumes authenticity.) They are nicely complementary, then,
to ordinary economic explanations.
We can now return to the topic of this Commentary. I am trying to ex-
plain why the economic analysis of payment law is so limited in scope. We
see that nominalism and privity explain core payment law very well-
much better than economics has done. Nominalism and privity are not eco-
nomic principles, or at least are not principles of any economics I have
heard of. Instead, they are principles of engineering design. Nominalism,
once understood, is trivial. If a digital computerized system is to function,
all of the inputs must be cognizable by a computer, and all the outputs must
be producible by a computer. In other words, the inputs and outputs must
be digital, i.e., symbolic. Between the inputs and outputs are legal rules,
i.e., symbol processing. And that is legal nominalism. Privity is a bit more
difficult. In design terms, privity assures modularity. This allows many
(near) independent units to exist and interact in fairly simple and predict-
able ways. Modularity is a key criterion of networks. Modularity allows
complex networked systems to be assembled from simple subsystems.
Modularity permits weak coupling among modules and a hierarchical sys-
39. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-312(b)(1), 9-341 to -342. But see U.C.C. § 9-327(3).
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tem design.40 And we see this in the world of payments: the tree topology
of the Article 8 indirect holding system, or the quasi-concentric hub-and-
spoke topology of correspondent networks.
Maybe privity and nominalism are somehow reducible to economics.
Isn't everything reducible to economics? Well, er, not really. The physicists
would demur, and even the most imperialistic economists would meekly
defer. However, I am not claiming that physics holds the key to the law of
payments. Nominalism and privity are design principles: engineering. The
question is whether engineering is reducible to economics, or at least the
kind of neoclassical microeconomics that passes for "economics" in the
law and economics literature.
This is a tough question. My extralegal training is in natural science-
not engineering (a substantially different discipline), and not economics.
But where training fails, there is always chutzpah. So I'll give it a whirl.
Economics, I have heard, is the study of rational choice under scarcity.
Economics takes scarcity and preferences as exogenous: supply and de-
mand. Engineering has nothing to do with preferences, or perhaps takes
them as exogenous. In either case, it works purely on the supply side. But
unlike economics, engineering does not take the supply side as exogenous.
Engineering seeks to push the supply curve down: better, cheaper, faster,
safer, newer. No arbitrary supply curve constrains engineering; it is con-
strained by only our natural world and our human ingenuity. Engineers
shift supply curves; economists match them to demand.
Engineering, like economics, describes rational goal-oriented activity.
But the goals are different. Engineering does not allocate scarce resources;
it makes more resources. And that is the role of nominalism and privity.
I will not make a further fool of myself with this homebrew founda-
tional argument. It is enough to repeat my empirical point. This Commen-
tary explains far more about core payment law than the entire law and
economics literature to date. This is not an argument. It is a fact.
II. SOCIOLOGY
There is another reason why payment law is not reducible to econom-
ics. Payments are social phenomena, and money has an extensive socio-
40. This sentence is probably incomprehensible to anybody not acquainted with the work of
Herbert Simon. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICLAL (1969). I do not have the
space to develop these ideas here. The "law and modularity" movement is not yet burgeoning, but may
be nascent. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1175 (2006); Sommer, supra note 12.
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logical literature. 41 The parties can select their medium of payment (e.g.,
bank debt, currency, or gold), but they cannot create it. By definition, a
purely bilateral "medium of payment" is mere barter. True payment media
are socially accepted. People accept dollar bills in payment only because
they know others will take them as payment. (The significance of legal
tender law is greatly exaggerated. 42) The acceptability of a medium of ex-
change need not be universal; indeed, it is almost never universal. In this
era of anti-money-laundering, nobody sells a house for currency, and no-
body buys a stick of gum with a wire transfer. But currency and wire trans-
fers both command many goods. What is true for media of payment is
doubly true for units of account. Two persons may select a unit of account,
but cannot create it. Most units of account are associated with sovereign
states. However, a unit of account can be created by mere social consensus,
without the state. 43 As with media of exchange, units of account are not
universal. But conversely, they are not always limited to their state of issue.
Tourist and border towns accept several units of account; the heartland
usually does not.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that sociology is not econom-
ics, and that sociology has something to say about money. The question
still remains: can sociology explain anything about the law of money that
economics cannot? I think that the answer is "yes."'44 Sociology tells us that
money is a confidence game. It works best when trusted, unquestioned:
Queen Victoria is loyally obeyed-without doubt, and without reason-
ing-by millions of human beings. If those millions began to argue, it
would not be easy to persuade them to obey Queen Victoria, or anything
else. Effectual arguments to convince the people who need convincing
are wanting. Just so, an immense system of credit, founded on the Bank
of England as its pivot and its basis, now exists. The English people, and
foreigners too, trust it implicitly. Every banker knows that if he has to
prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his arguments, in
41. E.g., GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (David Frisby ed., Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 3d enlarged ed. 2004); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY
(Princeton University Press 1997) (1994).
42. Legal tender "is neither necessary nor sufficient for the supply of monetary confidence and
may not even be important." Benjamin Klein, The Competitive Supply of Money, 6 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 423, 448 (1974); see also Rogers, supra note 10, at 1275. For the extremely narrow scope
of legal tender law, see Herman Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law of Commercial Instruments,
29 YALE L.J. 606, 609 (1920); CORBIN, supra note 10, §§ 1233, 1235.
43. Hayek argued that a non-statal unit of account was possible. F.A. HAYEK,
DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY-THE ARGUMENT REFINED 62-65 (2d extended ed. 1978). He was
right. The Second Life virtual world uses its own unit of account, which fluctuates against the dollar.
Second Life, Economy, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
44. For a fuller explanation, see Sommer, supra note 29, at 19-20.
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fact his credit is gone: but what we have requires no proof. The whole
thing rests on an instinctive confidence generated by use and years. 45
I once quipped: "Money is like the cartoon characters who run over a
cliff-they never fall until they look down."'46 To be unquestioned, a social
phenomenon must be unquestionable. Nominalistic rules lead to unques-
tionable results-if the authentication works well. Poor authentication leads
to Bush v. Gore,4 7 (yes, election law is nominalistic) or the ravages of
counterfeit money. Note that the rule can be questioned: why should we
keep the Electoral College? But the results obtained by the rule are not
questionable, if the authentication is good. Lincoln's electoral victory in
1860 was tremendously divisive-enough to trigger the Civil War. But
nobody argued that he did not win. His victory was the strongest kind of
social fact, built of (authentic) symbols alone.
Like engineering, sociology explains more core payment doctrine than
economics can. It explains the precision of the rules (if not their content),
and the tremendous importance of bank operational integrity. It does not
explain the risk-allocation rules for inauthentic messages, although it does
give some support for allocating the risk from the innocent believers to the
more cynical priests of Mammon.
III. NETWORKS
Payment law, I believe, has potent implications for network econom-
ics. Privity is the legal foundation of networked contractual systems. Priv-
ity gives legal structure to the network: creating some linkages, destroying
others, and limiting yet others. There may be exceptions to privity, but the
structure requires privity, at least to first order. So core payment law makes
contractual networks possible.
But here, we are more interested in the converse question. Does net-
work economics have anything to say about payment law? Network eco-
nomics certainly has legal implications, usually in antitrust. It may also
have implications for bank regulatory law.48 But does network economics
45. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 33 (Richard
D, Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873).
46. Sommer, :upra note 29, at 20.
47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). It may be worth noting that the legal rules for correcting poor electoral
authentication in a presidential election are themselves nominalistic. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This is
the basis for an argument that the Supreme Court's intervention in Bush v. Gore did not forestall a
legitimacy crisis. The sociology of nominalism also explains the legitimacy of voting, which is other-
wise a strange method of aggregating preferences, if you think about it. You are not supposed to think
about it: the social power of nominalism.
48. Ronald J. Mann, A Requiem for Sam's Bank, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 953 (2008).
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have any implications for payment law? The answer to this question de-
pends on the meaning of "payment law."
Payment law-as we have discussed it-works at the level of an indi-
vidual payment. It is not cognizant of payment system, as such, but is lim-
ited to payment transactions. Look at the U.C.C., drafted at the level of an
individual transaction: the collection of a check, the creation or pledge of a
security entitlement, and the progress of a wire transfer. There is a rich
network in which this transaction is embedded, but the transaction does not
know of the network.
However, this is true only to first order. Payment law-even defined
narrowly-does not completely exclude networks. The concept of "bank"
is a network concept,49 and payment law treats banks specially. 50 The
U.C.C. also recognizes system rules, and some payment law is constructed
almost completely out of system rules. Many of the system rules do not
affect individual payment transactions, but some do. Network imperatives
will dictate system rules, and some of these rules govern individual pay-
ment transactions. However, it may be worth noting that U.C.C. Article 4A,
apart from legitimating banks and system rules, barely notices the existence
of payment systems. 51
So I cannot conclude that network economics has no effect on core
payment law. But I doubt that the effect is material, for three reasons. First,
as stated above, payment rules focus on transactions, not systems. Second,
network economics is usually applied to the payment business, a portman-
teau of business model, governance, competitors, pricing, user traits, sys-
tem architecture, and who knows what else. Most of these have nothing to
do with payment law. Finally, clearing and settlement rules-no matter
who designs them with whatever motives-will be engineered by our old
friends privity and nominalism. Most of these core rules will be dominated
by these design principles, not by the business model. A suspension bridge
is a suspension bridge, whether built by greedy monopolists or selfless
philanthropists. They may design the tollgate very differently, depending
on the business model. But the engineering criterion of a good bridge does
not depend on the underlying business model.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19 (combinatorial discussion).
50. For similar reasons, payment law also treats hub intermediaries specially. See U.C.C. §§ 4-103
(clearing house rules), 4A-403, 4A-501 (funds-transfer system rules), 8-111 (clearing corporation
rules), 51 (c) (remedies) (2005).
51. U.C.C. §§ 4A-206 (recognizing funds-transfer system as informational agent of sender), 4A-
403 (payment through funds-transfer system).
2008]
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
IV. FASHION
I have argued that core payment law is beyond the reach of econom-
ics. Could I be wrong? Maybe economic analysis can be done-
somehow-but nobody has bothered to do it. Given the state of legal schol-
arship, this is not a wildly implausible statement. Scholars may dress in
drab attire, but they are dandified creatures of intellectual fashion. They
rush to trendy fields, often relabelling dowdy old research with stylish new
names. (Colloid chemistry, for example, has become "nanotechnology."
Way cool.) And more to the point, they sometimes avoid fields of study,
simply because their colleagues are doing the same. Then the fashion
changes, and a formerly frumpy research program suddenly loosens its
hair, drops its glasses, and becomes popular. For an example, look at the
economic analysis of conflict-of-laws. There was almost nothing until re-
cently, then a sudden efflorescence of scholarship. 52
Payment law is unfashionable, even when tarted up as "cyberlaw" or
the like. Posner, after all, did not even mention it. Public law is the darling
of today's law reviews. Even in private law, commercial law ranks well
behind corporate and bankruptcy law in the pecking order.53 And payment
law is the geek in the commercial law family,54 only befriended by in-
house bank practitioners, a few consumer advocates, and the kind of aca-
demic who would associate with such riffraff. Why would any scholar
study it? Or so the story goes.
I think that the story is true, to an extent. Nobody goes to law school
to become a payment lawyer. (And few payment lawyers learn their trade
in law school.) But true as this story may be, I do not think that it explains
much. Commercial law scholarship may be unpopular, but commercial law
scholars still toil away in the academy. People write articles, many of
which are good. Many payment lawyers can perform economic analysis of
payment law, at least at an informal level, and maybe even a formal level.
Leading commercial lawyers-both academic and practicing-often have
strong mathematical, scientific, or engineering backgrounds, 55 and a few
52. See Giesela RftLhl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801, 802 n.6 (2006).
53. See Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death ofAcademic Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 403,
420 (2007).
54. By 1979, the law of negotiable instruments had "disappeared from the curricula of most
forward-looking law schools." Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 441,446 (1979).
55. A short list off the top of my head (with an assist from Stephanie Heller): Neil Cohen (opera-
tions research), E. Allan Farnsworth (mathematics), Richard Field (engineering), Larry Garvin (neuro-
biology), Stephanie Heller (mathematics), George Hisert (mathematics), Kenneth Kettering
(mathematics), Charles McCallum (mathematics), Steven Schwarcz (engineering), Alan Schwartz
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are even Ph.D. economists. Unsurprisingly, their scholarship is often eco-
nomic in nature-inauthentic communications and consumer issues. Would
they analyze the economics of inauthentic communications, yet stop short
at the economics of clearing and settlement? I doubt it.
The social status of payment law may be low, but this does not explain
the economic analysis of core payment law. Economic analysis simply does
not work on the clearing and settlement rules of the payment system.
(physics), Jeff Turner (mathematics). Commercial law is very attractive to the nerdly mind. It offers
clean problems, with the promise of definite (but difficult) answers.
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